Larry L. Watts
Introduction: Alexander Dallin and Romanian Historiography
As long -time advocate for the republication of Alexander Dallin's
manuscript I was especially pleased at the reappearance of this
remarkable work. It is remarkable for several reasons, not the least
of which are the depth and breadth of his research and the fact
that nearly half century later western scholarship has produced
no better, or even comparable, work on the topic.
As the author states, the principal goals of his study were to reconstruct
and analyze the Transnistrian experience and its effect on the Soviet
population, and to compare Romanian rule with the German occupation.
On both points he succeeds admirably. Dallin was less concerned
with the motivations and intent of central Romanian authorities
and the variance in intended policies and actual implementation,
issues of central concern to Romanian specialists. Paradoxically,
even though he was explicitly focused on other aims and in spite
of the almost total inaccessibility of Romanian documentation when
it was undertaken, Dallin's work remains the most sophisticated
regarding the Romanian occupation of Transnistria.
Faced with an uneven database, particularly minuscule in the case
of Romanian, intent and policies were identified primarily though
the prism of those who observed or experienced their effect.1*
At the start then, it is important to recognize the obstacles which
confronted Dallin then and which still confront historians and analysts
of Romania today. At the most general level, the availability of
evidence and detail colors the subsequent nature of interpretation
given the natural tendency to presume that state leaderships
exercise relatively complete central control. More evidence and
greater detail inform one's of the conflicts, confusion, and failures
that exist between intent and implementation and justify a less
judgmental, more nuances and "forgiving " interpretation
of leadership intent. On the other hand, a paucity of evidence and
detail promotes interpretations of more rigid central control and
a unity between intent and implementation, thereby justifying more
simplistic and "harsher" interpretations of leadership
intent. This continues to characterize scholarship on Romanian during
this period.
The presumption of more rigid central control is often confounded
with unidirectional and policy-driven analysis in which a state
and/or its leadership is evaluated on the basis of only its negative
aspects while its positive aspects are neglected, ignored, or categorized
as marginal and unintentional phenomena and thus not meriting serious
attention. (Contrariwise, the same error is committed if one judges
a state exclusively on the basis of its positive aspects, categorizing
its failings as marginal or unintentional.) This approach is especially
prevalent among belligerents and interested parties during wartime,
tending to carry over into the subsequent historiography of the
war as well.2*
This is the case of the specialized literature on the region and
on Romanian in spades. There is a general and pronounced tendency
to attribute the occurrence of a negative phenomena in wartime Romania
and in Transnistria to purposeful Romanian intent, but to explain
all positive phenomena as a result of Romanian incompetence in carrying
out intent, usually because of presumably greater distribution on
venal characteristics among the Romanian people such as greed, corruption,
and laziness.3* It may be that specific
events were primarily or partly the result of such characteristics.
But this has to be empirically proven, not merely assumed on the
basis of cultural stereotype. While such analysis was not possible
at the Dallin's work, it can and should be seriously undertaken
today.
There is also a more specific effect of the uneven database deriving
from the inter-relationships between Germany and Romania on the
one hand and between the Soviet Union and Romania on the other.
There is a general tendency in the literature, also evident here,
to take German and Soviet pejorative statements and accusations
directed against the Romanians at face value while questioning similar
Romanian statements and accusations aimed at the Soviets and Germans
as doubtful or unreliable. Obviously, the preponderance of German
and Soviet sources necessarily reflects German and Soviet perspectives
and biases to a far greater degree than it reflects the Romanian
perspective and its biases.4* Less obviously,
as recent scholarship has discovered. the Germans exhibited a consistent
tendency to present their wartime allies as morally inferior, especially
in connection with atrocities and treatment of Jewish populations
which the Germans themselves often staged or initiated but also
with regard to "normal" abuses frequently committed by
troops in combat and occupation forces.5*
This not to assert that Romanian troops and local populations did
not engage in atrocities. Indeed, there is ample evidence of this
from a host of sources, many of them cited in this book. It is to
assert that German reports pertaining to their allies' behavior
cannot be assumed to be as complete and accurate as once thought
and should be treated with the same degree of caution and skepticism
as other sources, including Romanian ones.
Several factors make the relationship between the Soviet Union and
Romania and thus the evaluation of Soviet sources dealing with Romania
(and vice versa) not complex. First, for a variety of reasons Moscow
fostered a denigrator's attitude towards Romania ever since the
founding of the Romanian principalities.
This attitude survived into the Soviet regime in exacerbated from
because of the union of then Tsarist-held Bessarabia with the Romanian
Kingdom in 1918 to this the impact of Soviet wartime "enemy
image" projections and it becomes immediately understandable
why pejorative attitudes towards Romanian and Romanians dominated
among Soviet citizens. Throughout the interwar period, and even
during the Soviet-Romanian rapprochement of 1934-1939, the Soviet
line on Romanian "imperialism" was as a major aspect of
Soviet public propaganda.
However, the greatest impetus to prejudicial Soviet appreciations
came in two waves; the first after the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina in June 1940, and the second after the opening
of the need to brand the entire Romanian war effort criminal ( the
principal crime for which Romanians leaders were branded war criminals
in the 1946 trials being "aggression against Soviet Union").
This was necessary because international law still held Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina to be Romanian territories under Soviet occupation
at the start of the Romanian offensive, lending it the character
of just war (jus ad bellum).6* Not surprisingly,
it became a matter of Soviet policy to play down Romania's defensive
motivations for joining the campaign ant to attribute and emphasize
non-defensive motives to Romania, the baser the better. Predictably,
Romanian intent and behavior in Transnistria was a central battlefield
in this propaganda.
These cautions aside, Dallin's finding and impressions regarding
Romanian war aims, assimilationist policies, and the nature of Romanian
control remain significant for our interpretation of Romanian occupation
policies and have been substantially borne out by subsequently accessible
documentation.
Unfortunately, are also often neglected in mainstream literature
dealing with wartime Romania and therefore deserve something than
passing comment.
Motivations for Entering the War
Dallin's finding that Romania did not annex Transnistria, and that
only a small minority of Romanian officials entertained the idea,
has been verified by Axis and Allies sources alike.7*
As he points out, Romania was well aware that Germany sought to
persuade Romania to accept the territory as a trade-off for that
part of Transylvania whose transfer to Hungary Germany had underwritten
in 1940, something which the Romanians were loath to do. While this
was an important motivation , it was not the primary one.
Another partial motivation was a carry over of Romanian interwar
efforts to implement a rapprochement with the Soviet Union which,
given its military capabilities and outstanding claims on Romania
like those of Imperial Russia before it, was perceived as a threat
that could only be neutralized through the institution of a new
less antagonistic relationship. In this sense Romanian reticence
was much like that of Finland regarding participation in the siege
of Leningrad. It was like considered the straw that would break
the camel's back in terms of earning the undying enmity of the Russians
(o Soviet depending on the outcome of the war).
Additionally, and closer to the mark in identifying first priorities,
Romanian self-interest in preserving the post-World War I status
quo was closely linked to the recognition that Germany could never
equal the resource and manpower base of the British and French Empires,
the United States, and the Soviet Union. Once the Soviets joined
the League of Nations in 1934, almost immediately after the Germans
had left it and publicly condemned the Versailles peace arrangements,
Romanians conceived of the looming conflict of great powers on the
continent in terms of League defenders (supporters of the status
quo) and League attackers (revisionists).
The continuing and prevalence of Romanian thinking in this regard
is demonstrated by the fact that Romanian wartime leader Ion Antonescu
had himself pioneered the military aspects of the rapprochement
with the USSR such that, during 1934-1936, the bulk of Romanian
forces were transferred from the Soviet front to the Western front
with Hungary(which was already in relationship of security cooperation
with Germany).8* By 1937, over 15 divisions
were on the border of the USSR.9* Then Defense
Minister, Antonescu was projecting a clash between the "German-Italian
ideology" of revisionism and the status quo oriented "Franco-Soviet
ideology," to which Romania adhered for obvious reasons.10*
The appreciation of the military leaders and the military deployments
that followed from it, approved and supported by the political leadership,
were not seriously challenged until the German-Soviet co-invasion
of Poland in mid-September 1939, despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact. There was a broad consensus among Romanian military and political
leaders that, along with the Allies, Romania would initially be
fighting Germany and Axis on a roughly equal footing and then quickly
"gain an overwhelming superiority-militarily and materially-given
the immense resources of America, of the Soviets, and of the vast
colonial empires of the English and French."11*
This largely explains Antonescu persistence in arguing with the
U.S. representatives in early 1941 that only an American intervention
and compromise peace could protect Europe from disaster as well
as his readiness to admit in November 1941 that Germany had lost
the war against the Soviet Union.12*
Thus, Romania's primary motivation for resisting the annexation
of Transnistria was its manifest in preserving the defensive nature
of its war and its claim to the restoration of the status quo ante,
which would presumably return it the territories of Bessarabia,
Northern Bucovina, and northern Transylvania lost in 1940, This
was reflected in Romania's repeated insistence from August,1941
until August 1944 on the application of the Atlantic Charter, co-signed
by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, which explicitly refused
to recognize any territorial modifications implemented during the
war.13*
This is an extremely important point for evaluation Romanian war
aims and occupation policies and practices. If aggressive revisionism
and imperial aggrandizement could be demonstrated to constitute
Romania's primary motivation for joining the Eastern Campaign, then
a number of presumptions can be made about Romanian intent and subsequent
policies. For example, concern for international law was obviously
not a priority. Therefore, subsequent atrocities and annexations
policies do not require detailed explanation for the understanding
of Romanian wartime behavior. The logically follow from Romania's
primary motivation. First cause, imperialism and revision, obviously
took precedence over any concern for the restrictions of international
law.
If, however, Romania was adamant on restoring the status quo ante
and was attempting to adhere to the letter of international law
in pressing its case, then the presumptions regarding Romanian intent
and policies are quite different. Occupation policies must be evaluated
in terms other than how they promoted policies of annexation and
against the stipulations and restrictions of the laws of war, and
atrocities require investigation as to their cause and the official
reaction to them since they presumably deviated from intended Romanian
behavior. First cause, defensive response the only validating reason
for the use of force under international law, must be considered
not primary motivation and apparent deviations from its investigated.
The degree to which our understanding of Romania's motivations for
entering the war effects our interpretation of its subsequent behavior
in very specific and important ways. To take one example germane
to the study at hand , wartime administrations regardless of political
coloration tend to institute draconian regulations, often stipulating
the death penalty for a greater number of offenses that would not
be deemed as such in peacetime. These measures to preserve order
in periods of crisis are designed as disincentives rather than post
facto reprisals, and are generally not carried out or are carried
out in only symbolic fashion. If presumption is made that the state
authority values adherence to international law, then atrocities
connected with such stipulations are the legitimate subject of detailed
investigation to determine why and how the presumed deviation occurred
and who is responsible party or parties. It is not presumed that
such draconian practices typify the policies and intent of the respective
authority.
If, however, an a priori presumption of expedience rather than legality
is made, that atrocities linked to such measures are considered
a logical and inevitable consequence of them needing no further
explanation. Moreover, even, where there is no explicit evidence
that such measures were implemented they are presumed to have accurately
described normal regime behavior. For this reason alone, a serious
reconstruction of Romanian occupation policies and Romania's role
in the Second World War is very much in order.
Assimilationist Policies
Dallin was the first to establish that Romania did not adopt a program
of assimilation or "Romanization" towards the resident
Russian and Ukrainian populations, permitting the continued operation
of their cultural establishments, schools, journals and newspapers
in rather lassez-faire manner.14* In part,
as he notes, this was a reflection of Romanian political guide in
that Bucharest was attempting to win hearts and minds in the region
in preparation for the peace conference at the end of the war as
well as to create as inhospitable a climate as possible for the
reintroduction of the Soviet-style Communism. Also in part, this
difference with German occupation policies also reflected the fact
that Romanians did not perceive the Slavs as undermensch as did
Germans, but rather recognized the necessity of long-term coexistence
with what would inevitably by a large Slavic state to their east
no matter what the outcome of the war.
At the same time, however, there was an obvious "Romanization"
effort in that the Romanian authorities did attempt to introduce
or reintroduce Romanian history, tradition and language to the "Moldavian"
people-an ethnicity created by Stalin in 1924 in order to differentiate
ethnic Romanians under Soviet rule from ethnic Romanians under Romanian
rule and to foster the Soviet claim for Bessarabia and Romanian
Moldavia.15* To this end, the occupiers
introduced Romanian literature, grammar and textbooks, and established
a Moldavian faculty at Odessa University. Whether this can legitimately
be considered as assimilationist policy is an interesting question
given the prior attitude and nationality policy of the Soviet authorities
towards the Moldavians.
The transformation of the Moldavians to a privileged elite is in
itself a partial explanatory variable for subsequent Soviet attitudes
towards the Romanians and their administration. Moldavians under
Stalin had not received anything approaching equal treatment and
were consistently lower in the pecking older that either the Russians
or Ukrainians. Thus, even had the Romanians implemented an impartial
equality; it would have been natural for the resident Russians and
Ukrainians to perceive the Moldavians as "getting uppity."
Given that the average, presumably Slavic, citizen resented the
study of Romanian as in imposition and sometimes insult, as Dallin
points our, and further given that such things as bilingual signs
were introduced and Romanian made the compulsory first foreign language,
it is predictable that regardless of the "mildness" of
occupation policies, and aside from the effects of Soviet interwar
and wartime propaganda, a resentful attitude among the Slavic population
would have developed because of this perceived assault on their
relative social standing.
Central Control and Periodization
Dallin was the first to note that different periods of the Transnistrian
occupation are distinguishable in terms of the politics followed
by the Romanian authorities and their effect on the population.
The first few months during the winter 1941/1942 characterized by
terror, chaos, and insecurity, followed, in the spring of 1942 and
until the summer of 1943, by a relatively beneficent period for
the local population, even in comparison with the pre-war Soviet
regime. And finally, the period when the departure of the Romanians
seemed imminent which was characterized mire by change of attitude
by the occupied towards the occupiers rather than real changes in
occupation policies and practices (at least until the Germans took
over). A further aspect noted by Dallin that should inform later
work concerns the German presence. Even though the bulk of Germans
troops left Transnistria by the spring of 1942, the Germans did
not disappeared from the province, retaining a number of army echelon
s, central coordinating staff, administrative headquarters for rail
transport and operation of the port and antiaircraft installations,
as well as offices for economic exploitation in Transnistria throughout
the war.
But of the cause for the seemingly radical change from the first
few months of harshness and terror to the second period of mildness
and even opportunity was thus evidently related to the fact that
the front move through and out of the region, that German troops,
including the dreaded Einsatzgruppe, and the bulk of Romanian troops
moved out of the region with it, and that the military administration
was replaced be civilian one.16* In the
regard it should be noted that the due to the slow pace of authority
transfer, the first official Romanian decree to the population of
Transnistria was made public only on November 1,1941, and the last
regions (judete) were handed over by the Germans to Romanian control
only in the spring of 1942.
Another part of the cause for these changes, again first identified
by Dallin, was the existence of different and competing policy lines
and interests within the Romanian leadership and between the Romanians
and Germans. Unfortunately, this level of sophistication has not
permeated mainstream specialized literature to any great extent.17*
While Dallin sketches the various approaches to the Transnistrian
occupation, a number of central power struggles also influenced
the type and manner of policy adoption and implementation and then
understanding requires a brief review of the conditions surrounding
Antonescu's rise to power.
Antonescu was appointed the leader of the state by King Carol at
the beginning of September 940, after Carol invited the Iron Guard
into Government and while the Germans were insisting that the Guard
remain in gjvernment.18* From the start,
the Guard backed principally by Hitler's SD and the Nazi party,
fought with Antonescu over control of the state. Events came to
a head in the January 21-23, 1941, when the Guard mounted an unsuccessful
coup against Antonescu. This did not end German support for joint
Antonescu-Guardist government, however, and together with the German
Foreign Ministry, Hitler continued to insist that Antonescu rule
with allegedly "healthy sections" of the Iron Guard. In
order to placate the German that his refusal to do so did not mean
greater unreliability of the Romanian leadership, Antonescu appointed
a noted pro-German, General Iosif Iacobici, as Minister of Defense
four days after the Iron Guard rebellion.19*
Iacobici was an intimate of the Minister in Bucharest, a frequent
unofficial visitor to the German Embassy throughout 1941-1942, and
was known to be "very close" to the National Socialist
circles as well.20* On September 9,1941,
after the repeated failures and huge losses already incurred in
the siege of Odessa, Iacobici was named Commander of the 4th Army
responsible for the siege. As this was perceived a temporary posting
given mistaken appreciations that Odessa would soon fall, Iacobici
apparently retained the titular leadership of the Defense Ministry
as well. On September 22, after the Romanian Chief of Staff was
killed in a freak accident, Iacobici was named to that post, retaining
his Command of the 4th Army while relinquishing the Defense Ministry
to Antonescu's ad interim leadership.
Thus, Iacobici, who still had his staff at the Defense Ministry,
was simultaneously the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander
of the 4th Army fighting to take Odessa, a completely generis concentration
of responsibilities.21* Following the explosion
of Romanian Headquarters in Odessa on October 22, Iacobici requested
Antonescu to approve the reprisals he ordered on the scene. The
reprisals quickly became a massacre in which some 19,000 were killed.
A massive cover up was mounted with the full complicity on the 4th
Army Staff and the Headquarters General Staff; a feat which Iacobici
was in unique position to accomplish.22*
At about the same time as these events, Iacobici was initiating
a restructuring of the Romanian General Staff that would place in
on equal footing with the Ministry of Defense, making it and him
independent of the Defense Minister's control and thus replicating
Germany's independent Oberkommand Wehrmacht.23*
Antonescu had repeatedly refused Iacobici earlier proposals in this
regard even though the latter had German support. More to this point,
the restructuring would create a position for Iacobici in which
his authority would be second only to that of Antonescu and in which
he would be empowered to take executive decisions in the latter's
absence.
The discovery of this unauthorized initiative, previously rejected
by Antonescu, led to open and acrimonious conflict that was only
partially resolved by Iacobici's dismissal on January 20,1942.24*
Iacobici then apparently sought support of Berlin and the Iron Guard.
Finally, in December 1942 putsch attempt mounted be the Germans
and the Iron Guard, Iacobici launched an unsuccessful bid to replace
Antonescu as chief of state.25* Along with
crisis in Romanian-German relations, Antonescu subsequently cashiered
Iacobici from the army altogether.
Such dynamics as this, which obviously influenced both Romanian
internal politics and external politics in sometimes radical fashion
, were first hinted at by Dallin even though he was hampered by
virtually no access to official Romanian documents. Interesting
questions remain as to whether and to what degree such power struggles
affected the divergence in Romanian policies in Transnistria before
and after the winter of 1941/1942.
Context
Perhaps the principal strength of Dallin's study is its comparative
nature, making sense of the Romanian occupation policies. While
Dallin was uniquely qualified to undertake this particular comparison
given his earlier work on German occupation policies in the Soviet
Union, there are a number of other comparisons that promise to further
enlighten our understanding of the Romanian occupation and deserve
consideration.26*
For example, there is no comparison of the Soviet occupation policies
in Bessarabia and Bucovina that preceded the Romanian occupation
of Transnistria. While the study of the Soviet occupation of these
territories in 1940-1941 is still in its infancy, the potential
for providing a valuable context for interpreting the subsequent
Romanian occupation policies in the Soviet Union is self-evident.27*
Also useful in this regard would be comparisons with the Soviet
postwar treatment of the respective populations in both Bessarabia
and former Transnistria.
Finally, in seeking to analyze Romanian policies in Transnistria
it might be more useful, as originally suggested by Gerald Reitlinger,
to treat the Jewish populations of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina
deported to Transnistria separately from the Jewish populations
that remained under Romanian sovereignty throughout the war in the
Old Kingdom and southern Transylvania.28*
As present, the Transnistrian deportations are generally interpreted
as part of a Romanian Final Solution aimed at "dumping"
unwanted ethnicities abroad (and murdering as many as possible along
the way). Such an interpretation renders inexplicable the radical
improvement of the treatment of deported Jews in the spring of 1942;
Antonescu's guarantees, made in 1941 and 1943, of the physical safety
of the rest of the Jewish population under Romanian control (some
320,000), and of his refusal to deport them to death camps in the
autumn of 1942; aside from lending a schizophrenic quality to Romanian
occupation policies generally. If approached in differentiated manner,
useful comparisons might then be drawn with other displacements
of alleged "enemy aliens" during the war; for example,
the evacuation of ethnic Japanese (also numbering about 120,0000
) from the Pacific West Coast in the United States during 1942 and
the relocation of various minorities within the Soviet Union during
the war (Volga Germans and , after their annexation , Poles, Lithuanians,
Latvians, etc.).29*
In conclusion, because of the stated intention of the work and the
paucity of Romanian sources Dallin could only present Romanian intention
and policy from the perspective of those who experienced or observed
their practical effects. At the same time, his insight has made
this work the principal scholarly reference on Romanian occupation
policies during the war to this day and a great boon to the historiography
of the Romania generally. I fully share Dr. Dallin's hope that the
appearance of this work will spark further study of a long-neglected
aspect of World War II history. I also share his belief that his
basic themes and general conclusions will stand the test of time.
Indeed, after almost half a century, one might argue that they already
have.
_______________
1* Perhaps
the most pertinent materials now accessible are those in Archivele
Statului Bucharest (Bucharest State Archives) and Archivele Ministerrului
Apararii Nationale (Archives of the Ministry for Motional Defense
in Bucharest and Pitesti, and in less easel accessible military
cabinet records of Romania wartime leader Ion Antonescu held in
Osobii Archiv in what used to be the Central State Archives of the
USSR in Moscow. There are significant collections of pertinent American
and British materials related to these problems that have been declassified
since 1974 in the United States Archives in Washington D.C. and
the British Public Records Office at Kew, England.
2* Compare, for example, the Second World
War construct of the "Grand Alliance" and its effect on
propaganda and subsequent historiography, with the differentiated
treatment of the states and leaderships in the 1991 Yugoslav crisis.
For an interesting discussion of the first case see Norman Davies,
"The Misunderstood War", The New York Times Review of
Books, June 9,1944, pp.20-22. For the second, see Constantine P.Danopoulos
and Kostas G.Messa, editors, Crisis in the Balkans: Views from the
Participants, Boulder, West view.
3* This approach is to prevalent in the literature
that the cultural stereotyping it represents, and the presumption
of guilt and culpability implied within it, continue to go unremarked
by serious scholars. Simply put, if Romanians did something bad
they meant it. If they did something good, they did not. It fact,
they preferred and attempted to do something worse but were prevented
by their own incompetence and venality. Can this seriously be considered
a valid framework for analysis? Dallin's findings can be read as
a wake up call for applying the same rules of empirical validation
to Romania during this period as to any other object of historical
inquiry.
4* E.g., compare the evaluations of Romanian
motivation and intent with those presented in Kurt Treptow, ed.,
A History of Romania, Iii, Center for Romanian Studies,1997.
5* Daniel Jonah Goldhagen describes how the
German Einsatzgruppe often misattributed their carefully orchestrated
atrocities tom local populations and allies in his Hitler's Willing
Executioners: Ordinary German and the Holocaust, New York, Alfred
A. Kmopf,1966, pp.518-520.
6* This was a unique situation. In Finland,
for example, Helsinki was compelled to sign the Treaty of Moscow
in March 1940 thus legally ceding Finnish territories lost in the
Winter War to the Soviets and placing international law on the side
of the USSR. Since Moscow evidently covered more Romanian territory
to such treaty was ever concluded over Bessarabia or Bucovina before
the end of the war. Romania also had other defensive arguments for
participating in the offensive. For instance, the Soviets seizure
of several Romanian islands in October 1940, and maneuvers and dispositions
indicating Soviet plans for a preemptive attack. See, e.g., Brian
I.Fugate and Lev Dvoretsy, Thunder on the Dneper: Zhukov-Stalin
and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg, Novato, CA, Presidio,1997,
and R.H.S. Stolfi, Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted,
Norman, University of Oklahoma Press,1993. For the debate over the
broader significance of Soviet offensive plans see John Erikson
and David Dilks, editors, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh,
Edinburgh University Press, 1994, and Joseph L. Wieczynski, editor,
Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on the Soviet Union June
22,1941, Salt Lake City, Charles, Schlacks, Jr.,1993.
7* Perhaps the clearest statement of Romanian
official policy can be found in Foreign Relations of the United
States 1941, Volume I, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office,
1958,pp.326327. Memorandum of conversation between Secretary of
State, Cordial Hull with Romanian Charge d'Affaires, Brutus Coste
September 4,1941. See also ,United States National Archives (USNA),
State Department Records, Office of Strategic Services Research
and Analysis Report #1518, "Romania: The Present Situation,
"December 17, 1943,p.14. The literary attempts of the pro-annexationists
were meager in comparison with similar Finnish attempts regarding
the annexation of Soviet Karelia. See, e.g., C. Leonard Lundin,
Finland in the Second World War, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press,1957, pp.125-142.
8* See, e. g .,ASB, fond Presedintia Consiliului
de Ministri, dosar nr. 24/1934, f.1-2, and MAN, fond 948/RSS3, dosar
nr.I 315,f.116-120 and dosar nr.I 414, f.3; fond 948, dosar nr.437,and
fond nr.332, dosar nr.30, f 4, 47 and 99-102.
9* MAN, fond 948/RSS3 (General Staff Operations),
dosar nr. 380,f.56, dosar nr.456, f.273, dosar nr.I 414,f.184'dosar
nr.I 594,f. 6; fond 948, dosar nr.416,f. 398-402,407 and 490-495,
dosar nr.434,f. 65-70 and 152-155, and dosar 438,f.627; fond 333,dosar
nr.601,f.430-437; and fond Marele Stat Major, Sectia 3 operatii,
vol 1024,f. 120-121.
10* MAN, fond 948,dosar nr.438, f.268-269.
11* MAN, fond 948/RSS3 (General Staff-Operations),
dosar nr. I 706, f. 31-37, and fond 948 dosar nr. 493,f.153.
12* See, e.g., USNA, State Department Records,7400011,February
25,1941,Franklin Mott Gunter to the Secretary of State; ibid, March
28,1941, Gunter to the Secretary of State; ibid, 871.oo/911, Telegram
#960, November 15, 1941, Franklin Mott Gunter to the Secretary of
State. Antonescu was equally insistent to the German that only a
quick offensive against the USSR, launched and completed before
the resources of the United States could be brought to bear, had
a chance of success.
13* See, e.g., British Public Records Office
(PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/43992, Document R 1472, Telegram
#5, January 21,1944, Lieutenant Colonel Neame, Press Reading Bureau,
Stockholm, to Political Intelligence Department, London,pp.100102.
Antonescu was equally insistent with Hitler that his goal was to
restore the status quo and reestablish Romanian territorial borders,
not expand them. USNA, Modern Military Branch, OSS Record Group
226, Document #1196781, February 11,1942, Ion Antonescu to Adolph
Hitler.p.2.
14* Subsequent work on Ukrainian history
continues to omit this important detail, implying an effort to forcibly
assimilate the Slavic population. See, e.g., Paul Robert Magosci,
A History of Ukraine, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1996,p.625.
15* Charles King, "The Moldavian ASSR
on the Eve of the War: Cultural Policy in 1930s Transnistria,"
Romanian Civilization, IV:3 (Winter, 1995-1996), pp.25-52.
16* For example, the staff of the 4th Army
based in Iasi and in closest liaison with the Germans had proven
an uncertain instrument even before the campaign. During the rebellion
of January 1941, the 4th Army Commander publicly supported the Iron
Guard against Antonescu. According to one authority, other senior
Romanian officers considered Antonescu only primus inter pares and,
as consequence of "decades of close involvement in civilian
government," insubordination and disobedience "continued
to plague the officer corps." Mark Axworthy et al., Thirt Axis,
Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War 1941-1945,
London , Arms and Armour,1995,p.60.
17* See, e.g., The treatment in Keith Hitcheens,
Romania 1866-1947, Oxford, Clarendon Press,1994, especially pp.
471-487.
18* For a description of the dynamics between
King Carol, the Iron Guard, and Antonescu see Larry Watts, Romanian
Cassandra:Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, New York, Columbia
University Press,1993, especially chapters IV,V, and VI.
19* General Colonel Damitru Cioflina, coordinator,
Sefii Marelui Stat Major Roman 1941-1945, Bucharest, Editura Militara,1995,pp.17-19
and 75-76. Iacobici had actually fought against Romania as an officer
with the Central Powers in World War I. On the other hand, the Germans
did not yet consider Antonescu a "safe man" See Archivele
institului de studii istorice si social politice, fond 10, dosar
nr.9G,f.90; Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauffrag Sudot 1940-1943: Bericht
eines fleigenden Diplomaten, Berlin, Musterschmidt Verlag,1957,pp.52-53;
Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Volume V,
Document 169,pp.234-236.
20* Romanian and Allied sources, are in
agreement on this point. See, e. g., Ion Gheorghe, Rumaniens Weg
zum Satellitenstaat, Heilelberg, Kurt Vownickel Verlag.1952, pp.223-224;
PRO, FO 371/373/74, Document R482, Telegram #31, January 22,1943,D.Howard
to Foreign Office, and FO 371/373/76, Document R9441, pp.19-20.
21* Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Konig Karol
and Marschal Antonescu:Die Deutsche-Rumanischen Bezeihungen 1938-1944,
Weisbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag,1954, p.142. Antonescu was functioning
at the time as Commander-in-Chief of the entire war effort as well
as head of state.
22* Axworthy (1995), pp.143 and 217. See
also the testimony at the war crimes trial reproduced in Marcel
Dumitru Ciuca, Procesul Maresalului Antonescu:Documente, Volume
III, Bucharest, Europa Nova, 1995, p.169.19,000 is generally accepted
the most probable figure but Soviet sources immediately claimed
60,000 deaths and later Swedish pamphlet claimed 26,000. While in
Soviet captivity Antonescu was compelled to sign two confessions,
one claiming the massacre of 100,000 at Odessa and one 200,000.
23* Cioflina (1995) pp.20 and 95-98; MAN,
fond 316, dosar nr.25, f.3-7.
24* Order #19 of the Commander-in -Chief,
Marshal Ion Antonescu to Army Corp General Iosif Iacobici, 20 January
1942 in MAN, fond Cabinetul Militar al Conducatorului Statului,
dosar nr.25, f.3-7.
25* USNA, Modern Military Branch, OSS Record
Group 226, Box 993, Document #89221, Report #D-1692, August 2,1944,
and Ibid, Military Field Branch, Record Group 319, Box 968, File
092., August 18, 1943, Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, Middle
East (JICAME0),USAFIME, PIC Pap#14, "Political Alignments in
Roumania, November 1942 to July 1953."
26* See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in
Russia 1941-1945: A Study of Occupation Policies, London, St. Martin's
Press, 1957 (second edition,1981).
27* The significance of such a comparison
is suggested in Dennis Deletant's contribution on Bessarabia in
I.C.B.Dear and M.R.D. Foot, editors, The Oxford Companion to World
War II, Oxford, Oxford University Press,1995,p.129. Initial attempts
that merit attention include Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Constantin,
Bessarabia in anii celui de-al doilea Razboi Mondial, Iasi, Institutul
European,1995; Adrian Pop, editor, Sub Povara Granitei Imperiale,
Bucharest, Editura Recif,1993; and Ion Siscanu, Raptul Basarabia
1940, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Dacia, 1993.
28* Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution:
The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945,New York,
Thomas Yoseloff, 1971,p.426 and footnote 42. See also pp.540-541.
29* See, e.g., Page Smith, Democracy on
Trial :The Japanese American Evacuation and in World War II, New
York, Simon & Schuster,1995,pp.121-124; Roger Daniels, Concentration
Camps; North America: Japanese in the United States and Canada and
Canada During World War II, Melbourne, FL.,1981; and Martin Macauley,
"Deportations" in Dear and Foot, The Oxford Companion
to World War II, op. cit.,pp.295-296. |
